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"thing" and "object" serves to lay bare the onedimensional mode of modem man that is largely the
consequence of tbe quest to gain domination over nature
through technology, and to thereby regard the natural
world as a commodity.
Michael Zimmerman is one deep ecologist who has
emphasized the importance of ontology for determining
conduct towards nature. Carrying forward the ideas of
Heidegger, he states the matter in the following way.
Ontological issues pertain to the Being of
entities, to tbat, what, and how they are. Every
culture has a common way of understanding
what tbings are, although this ontology is often
so pervasive that people are unaware tbat they
have a particular way of apprehending tbings.
Usually, we tbink things really are the way
they appear to us. But this naive idea doesn't
stand up to critical scrutiny; the fact is that
how things appear is determined to some
extent by the ontological paradigm in the light
of which they are seen. 2

The history of environmental philosophy testifies
to two strands of tbought tbat stand in stark contrast
to one anotber: antbropocentrism and biocentrism. In
reaction to tbe traditional antbropocentric position,
deep ecology has argued for a biocentric view of tbe
humanity-nature relation. Against antbropocentrism,
the deep ecologists have challenged the basic
assumptions of tbe Western scientific-technological
paradigm by proposing alternative paradigms that
support biocentrism. One of the central issues
confronting tbe development of an environmental etbic
is the manner in which paradigms prefigure attitudes
about nature. The approach of some deep ecologists
is straightforwardly ontological as evidenced by the
attempt to challenge scientific materialism as a
paradigm about the nature of being.
In this paper I want to explore some of the ideas in
the later writings of Heidegger in order to show how
they may be placed in tbe context of deep ecology. His
ontology, I believe, sponsors a biocentric view that
regards all natural entities as possessing inherent value
by virtue of their interrelation to tbe surrounding world.
In particular, I will discuss Heidegger's position in his
essay "The Thing."1 The distinction he draws between
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For Zimmerman, and for deep ecologists, ontology
precedes ethics. We must fIrst know what things are
before deciding what norms of behavior we ought to
adopt. The ontology that we are implicitly or explicitly
committed to determines the way value is ascribed to
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When and in what way do things appear as
things? They do not appear by means of human
making. But neither do they appear without
the vigilance of mortals. The first step toward
such vigilance is the step back from the
thinking that merely represents....5

the natural world. Heidegger's ontology may
contribute to deep ecology in two ways. First, by
offering a critique of anthropocentric attitudes toward
nature. Secondly, by cultivating a new perspective on
the theme of interrelatedness between man and the
natural environment.
Heidegger brings forward this ontology in his
discussion of "the thing." Unlike a Platonic analysis
into abstract entities that seeks to reveal eternal forms,
Heidegger endeavors to uncover the nature of a thing
that is more primordial than a sum of determinate and
universal characteristics. He endeavors to reveal the
particular concrete existent along with its interconnectedness to the world. His method is phenomenological
in that it seeks to disclose that which shows itself in all
its particularity. In contrast to modern technology which
encourages a tendency to represent things as
quantifiable objects to be controlled and dominated,
Heidegger requests that we allow ourselves to be
approached by the thing in its interrelation to the
surrounding environment.
This perspective serves to underscore an essential
theme from the deep ecology view in that it·openly
addresses fundamental assumptions about man's relation
to nature. Things are not perceived as everyday objects
when we allow the thing to present itself to us without
pragmatic interests added to it. Rather than confronting
the world, conditioning it, objectifying it for the sake of
self interest, Heidegger recommends that we open
ourselves to the world through attunement with it.
Heidegger warns against confusing everyday objects
with a thing. When the confusion does occur, "things are
no longer admitted as things"; and because of our
calculative mode of thinking, they will not be able "to
appear to thinking as things." 3 Everyday objects are
conceptual constructs designed in conformity with our
utilitarian interests. In contrast to this pragmatic posture,
Heidegger suggests that we "let beings be," that means
being attuned to the "unique ways in which entities
present themselves or are. Letting something be can mean
simply letting it alone, as in the case of not disturbing a
wild place." 4 Indeed, there is more involved in authentic
thinking about the environment than the thinking that
regards it as a mere sum of objects possessing only
instrumental value. Thus a Heideggerian approach to
deep ecology is initiated through a radical re-thinking of
the calculative-utilitarian mode of perceiving the world.
Consequently, this inquiry brings forth a reappraisal of
the way the world is intended. Heidegger writes,
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In this passage Heidegger critiques the traditional
epistemological distinction between the human knower
and the object known. According to that distinction, as
Heidegger sees it, the thing is surreptitiously identified
as nothing more than an object constituted by universal
characteristics. That view has dominated Western
thought since Plato. Because we look upon things as
separate from us we fabricate a dichotomy between self
and world. Once the dichotomy has been manufactured,
the thing is regarded as a mere object; it has a "separate
location"6 from any other entity in the environment.
Thus, a thing such as a tree, for example, is represented
as an object with the trait of "life" somehow added to
it. By man's continual "forgetfulness" he tends to add
characteristics to a thing and treat it as an object to be
subdued by human control. This attitude is suggestive
of the calculative thinking which artificially fabricates
the thing with a view to quantifying it.
Through conceptually representing his field of
experience, man objectifies the thing by reducing it to a
set of concepts which artificially reconstruct the thing?
Formulas are devised so the thing can be regarded like
any object that is translated into the formula's mode of
expression. The aim of calculative thinking is to reduce
the thing to elements that are common with elements of
other objects. The thing is fragmented into parts, and
though it is a unique entity, its uniqueness is blurred as a
result of the fragmentation. This reduction has a utilitarian
value because it enables us to grasp the thing in terms of
universal concepts. As a consequence, things are
represented as common objects. Because of the
calculative mode, says Heidegger, "we separate subjects
and objects, inside and outside, feelings and situations....
These many divisions are not separate issues, since each
involves the same type of conceptual construct of
things......8 In his essay, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking,"
Heidegger expresses the manner in which the essential
nature of the thing has been lost.
Our thinking has, of course, long been
accustomed to understate the nature of the
thing. The consequence, in the course of
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that cannot and should not be violated," the sky is "the
luminous aspect of the world necessary to draw forth
what the Earth conceals," men are the ones who
participate in the life process and the gods are an
expression of the divine in a harmonious world. 12 The
harmonious interplay of the fourfold constitutes the
moments of the world through the presence of a thing.
Being a container, the jug gathers by taking and
holding, but it further reveals the fourfold by pouring
forth. Its out-pouring is a gift which regenerates the
interplay of the fourfold. How is the fourfold gathered
in the jug? The earth gathers since the drink comes from
the earth's waters. The sky gathers because it offers the
warmth of sun which is needed for the creation of the
drink. The men gather since it is they who celebrate the
joy of drinking. The gods gather since they are the ones
whose honor is being drunk to. Thus, the jug reveals
the mingling of the fourfold in the dimension of Being.
The interplay of the fourfold suggests a value to the
world that contrasts sharply with the value attributed
to it by the technological paradigm ofanthropocentrism.
For Heidegger the world is manifested as an opening
which allows things to emerge; the world is that which
comes forth and merges as a totality. Thus things are
not lifeless atomic units detachable from their
surroundings, rather they always bear an intimate
relation to their environment. This view is compatible
with the deep ecologists' emphasis on the interrelation
of all things within a unifying matrix. For Heidegger, a
thing is the center for the harmonious integration of the
four moments of Being. Moreover, the world is revealed
through each thing that comes to presence. Thus a thing
is ''more than a mere fact, more than something 'at hand'
(vorhanden). It represents in a unique way the full
richness of all 'regions' of Being as a whole."13 The
thing so revealed is not an object of technological
domination, nor is it dislocated from its environment.
An understanding of the thing is intertwined with an
understanding of the world.
.
Unlike the anthropocentric view that sharply
distinguishes between man and nature, Heidegger sees
man as an integral part of the fourfold. Humans are
"portrayed as one of the four aspects needed to
constitute an authentic dwelling place. Like a deer or
jug or tree or bridge, a mortal can be a 'thing' that
provides the nexus through which the other participating
dimensions of the world can reveal themselves."14
The unity and interplay of the four members are
further characterized by Heidegger as a "round dance"

Western thought, has been that the thing is
represented as an unknown X to which
perceptible properties are attached. From this
point of view, everything that already belongs
to the gathering nature of this thing does, of
course, appear as something that is afterward
read into it. 9 '
Throughout the history of Western thought we see a
constant attempt to uncover the substance of a thing. Yet
Heidegger suggests that a thing's underlying substance
cannot be discerned from that which is gathered around
a thing. The effort to delineate an independent substance
disfigures the nature of a thing because its nature is part
and parcel of its surrounding world.
Heidegger's investigation reveals the inauthentic
attitude that man has developed toward the environment.
"We ignore the intrinsic harmony of living beings, as
well as whole biomes, for ontologically everything has
been reduced to the level of raw material for production
and consumption."10
Although Heidegger has laid out the inauthentic
attitude toward the environment, he offers an alternative
for understanding the man/nature relationship. He
illustrates this alternative by examining simple artifacts
or natural entities as an example of a thing. Take a jug,
says Heidegger, when we allow the being of the jug to
come forth we observe that it presents itself as a process
of "gathering in." It becomes the focus of a whole set of
interconnections with its environment. However, the
process of "gathering in" is only one feature of the jug's
essence. Within the jug's capacity to contain is also the
capacity to offer and pour drink. Granted that the jug has
utility for men, but this artifact has a deeper significance.
The essence of the thing is that which gathers-up
and comes-together, creating a presence of the fourfold
unity of earth, sky, gods and men. The thing manifests
the harmonious interplay of the fourfold in the world.
The jug is a particular unity that exemplifies the
integration of the earth, sky, men and gods. The thing
assembles the unity of the fourfold, making possible
their interrelation to one another. The thing, wrote one
commentator, "evokes the 'quadrate,' gathers into
unified presences the four moments, brings them into
an abiding 'stand still,' to self-manifestation, to
unconcealedness."ll The earth, sky, men and gods are
involved in one another so as to form a simple unitythe fourfold. Zimmerman explains these moments by
saying that the earth is "the life-giving aspect of things
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(gering) where each member of the fourfold assemble
as participants of a unifying process. The round dance
involves a double aspect. On the one hand, it presents a
unity of the fourfold; the four gather appearing as a
simple unity. As the fourfold gives the appearance of
being a simple prevailing unity, it is characterized as a
thing. On the other hand, the round dance also involves
a dimension which consists of the fourfold in their
interplay. This aspect of the round dance is called the
world. Through the moments of the round dance the
world and thing are gathered together, mutually
configurated, not juxtaposed to one another. World and
thing are two moments of one and the same process of
the round dance.
It may be further pointed out that Heidegger's
account avoids reductionism since both the thing and
world retain their respective integrity. The world is not
reduced to a mere collection of objects; the thing is not
reduced to an atomic unit isolated from other entities.
The fourfold, in the self-creating process of the round
dance, are like threads which weave together the weft
of the thing and world.
Heidegger has spoken of the fourfold as being a
"whole infinite relation." None of the fourfold "stays
and goes one-sidedly by itself. In this sense, none
are finite. None are without others. In-finite, they
hold themselves to each other, they are what they
are from this in-finite relation, they are this whole
itself."15 The fourfold is an in-finite relation in that
no one member has a unified and determinate nature
in isolation from the other members. As in deep
ecology, Heidegger emphasizes interrelations
throughout nature. Tbings do not exist alone, they
are what they are through their intrinsic relation to
the environment.
Wbere does man stand in the presencing ofthe world?
He emerges as one who lives with things----a participant
member of the fourfold. The integrity of man is recognized
by the fact thai he is a necessary feature of, and belongs
together with, the fourfold interplay. Heidegger's
discussion certainly breaks away from the one-dimensional
man nestled in the paradigm of mechanistic materialism.
The technological orientation of contemporary man veils
the presence of the thing by representing it as an everyday
object cut off from the world and having nothing more
than an instrumental value.
Heidegger's discussion of "thing" and "world"
brings forth an ontological basis for interpreting the
theme of interrelation that is an essential feature for
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deep ecology. His reflections serve to challenge
anthropocentric attitudes toward nature that have
emerged with the development of a mechanistic worldview. For deep ecology, he offers a way of regarding
nature that is nonanthropocentric while boldly
contemplating the possibility to "let beings be." For
Heidegger, as for deep ecology, this means allowing a
place for revealing man's interrelatedness and
rootedness in Being as such.
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